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GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
CLEARING MASSACHUSETTS'S
UNCERTAIN ROAD TO POST-CONVICTION
DNA TESTING
CHRISTIAN VAN BUSKIRKt
INTRODUCTION

Dennis Maher spent nineteen years in prison for crimes he
did not commit.' There were few people that believed he was
innocent, and with good reason: all three of his alleged victims
identified him as the perpetrator.2 Their testimony led to
Dennis's conviction, a life sentence, and the evisceration of any
credibility his innocence claim may have maintained.' Dennis
was no longer an innocent man. He had been given a fair trial,
and a jury of his peers found him guilty. Dennis was a convict.'
Even if someone were to believe him, what evidence could be
more conclusive than the testimony of the only people who not
only witnessed, but also experienced the crime first hand? The
answer, as it would turn out, was DNA evidence. In 2003, after
nineteen years in prison, DNA evidence eliminated the

t Notes & Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, May 2012,
St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2006, Catholic
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selecting the topic of this Note, and to the late Professor Thomas Shea for all of his
guidance both throughout law school and on this Note. His example as an educator
and an attorney will be missed by the St. John's Law community. I especially want
to thank Caitlin Brown; I owe all of my success to your love and support.
1See Michael Wilson, Exonerated, But On Their Own: Helping Those ClearedBy
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2003, at Bl.
2 See Dick Lehr, Dennis Maher's Journey; 19 Years Later, Innocence Comes
Home, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2003, at Al.
3 See id.
" During his time in prison, the therapy staff regarded Dennis as an offender in
denial, and bringing Dennis to accept accountability for his crimes was their "big
prize." Id. As part of the staffs pursuit of the "big prize," Dennis was forced to live
amongst and sit in on group therapy sessions with convicted rapists and child
molesters. Id.
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possibility that Dennis was responsible for the crimes for which
he was convicted.' Despite a seemingly airtight case against
him, DNA evidence proved he was innocent.
Unfortunately, stories like Dennis's have played out in
courtrooms across all fifty states. Since 1989, DNA evidence has
been used to exonerate 273 wrongfully convicted prisoners, most
of whom were convicted of either rape or homicide.' On average,
those men and women spent thirteen years in prison before being
released.7 Like Dennis, these men and women had to overcome
the crushing weight of their guilty verdict. 8 Their stories,
specifically the years they lost to wrongful prison sentences,
underlie the importance of access to DNA testing. No other
evidence, scientific or otherwise, offers the accuracy that DNA
Without DNA, Dennis and the
fingerprinting9 provides.' 0
hundreds of others exonerated by DNA testing would have been
left in prison with little chance of release. If justice is not to be
seen as incidental to the criminal justice system, then convicted
prisoners with valid innocence claims must be afforded access to
DNA testing.
Access to post-conviction DNA testing, however, is in a state
of uncertainty.

In District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, the

Supreme Court of the United States held that prisoners do not

See id.
See Facts on DNA Post Conviction Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts-onPostConviction DNAExoneratio
ns.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
' See id.
5

6

" See Brandon L. Garrett, JudgingInnocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 109 (2008)

(documenting that in fifty percent of cases in which DNA evidence exonerated a
convicted person, reviewing courts had commented on the exoneree's likely guilt and
in ten percent of the cases had described the evidence supporting conviction as
"overwhelming").
' DNA fingerprinting, or profiling, refers to the unique genetic signature that
each human being possesses. In overly simplified terms, scientists are able to isolate
DNA and identify certain markers. If the markers from two samples match, then
there is an extremely high probability that the two samples came from the same
source. LORNE T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1992). Thus, if
the DNA markers found on a hair from the crime scene match the DNA markers of
the defendant, the hair is from the defendant.
10 See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POST CONVICTION
DNA TESTING xiv (1999) ("The strong presumption that verdicts are correct, one of
the underpinnings of restrictions on postconviction relief, has been weakened by the
growing number of convictions that have been vacated because of exclusionary DNA
results.").
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have a substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing," despite
its powerful probative value to the criminal justice system.' 2
Instead, convicted prisoners only have a right to access DNA
testing if the legislature of the state in which they were convicted
has created a right to post-conviction DNA testing. Though this
decision does not provide the clear road to testing that petitioner
Osborne argued for,'3 it does provide prisoners with a method for
challenging the state's procedures for gaining access to DNA
testing. The Court held that once the state has created a right to
access testing, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
provides petitioners with certain protections that ensure they can
vindicate their right to DNA testing.'4
The Osborne decision has opened the door to challenging
state statutes on procedural grounds. One such state with a
testing statute ripe for challenge is
post-conviction
5
Massachusetts.' Massachusetts elects to handle post-conviction
DNA testing through its general post-conviction discovery rule,
which applies to both DNA and non-DNA evidence." In applying
this rule, Massachusetts state courts have held that the
introduction of new evidence is barred unless it is likely to

" Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009).
12 Though this Note will only discuss DNA's ability to exculpate the wrongfully
convicted, there is an equally important history that demonstrates DNA's ability to
inculpate perpetrators. See Amitai Etzioni, DNA Tests and Databases in Criminal
Justice: Individual Rights and the Common Good, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 197, 200-01 (David Lazer ed. 2004)
(discussing the creation and use of DNA databases to identify suspects). In fact, the
belated testing of DNA in wrongful convictions has at times led to the true
perpetrator being found through the use of DNA data banks. See generally JENNIFER
THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTTON, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009).

'3 See Press Release, Innocence Project, U.S. Supreme Court Decision on DNA
Testing Is Disappointing But Will Have Limited Impact, Innocence Pioject Says
(June 18, 2009), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/USSupreme
CourtDecisiononDNATestingIsDisappointingButWillHave LimitedImpac
tInnocenceProject Says.php.
14 See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319 (explaining that once the state has established
a liberty interest in obtaining post-conviction DNA testing, that right may "beget yet
other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right." (quoting
Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981))).
" This Note will address Massachusetts's statute, but the principles underlying
the argument are applicable to many other states, and may even provide a blueprint
for a due process challenge of the statutes in those states.
16 See generally MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30.
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exonerate." While this standard may be appropriate for evidence
of lesser accuracy than DNA, absent a more nuanced approach to
its application, the rule serves as an unconstitutional roadblock
to petitioners.
This Note argues that the current procedures for obtaining
DNA testing in Massachusetts are fundamentally inadequate,
and should be modified to reflect the unique power of DNA
testing.
Part I of this Note explores the text of the
Massachusetts post-conviction discovery statute, and discusses
the procedures that the courts have created for its
implementation. Part II explains the framework of a postOsborne procedural due process claim for post-conviction DNA
relief and the constitutional standards that the state procedures
must satisfy. Finally, Part III applies that framework and
argues that Massachusetts's court-created procedures are
violative of due process because they do not reflect the unique
power of DNA testing. It further contends that Massachusetts
should adopt procedures that examine the ability of exculpatory
test results to undermine the prosecution's theory of conviction,
rather than the probability of obtaining exculpatory results.
I.

MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 30 AND ITS
APPLICATION

In 1979, the Massachusetts legislature passed Rule 30 of the
Massachusetts Criminal Procedure ("Rule 30"). The law was
designed to provide the state's "exclusive vehicle for post
Rule 30 invests wrongfully convicted
conviction relief."' 8
prisoners with the right to petition a judge for release on the
grounds that they are innocent. 9 Subsection (a) of the statute
states:
Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained
pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right,
file a written motion requesting the trial judge to release him or
her, or to correct the sentence then being served upon the

17 See Commonwealth v. Evans,
786 N.E.2d 375, 393 (Mass. 2003) ("The
defendants have failed to make the prima facie showing that the tests now sought
would have produced results that likely would have influenced the jury's
conclusion.").
1I Leaster v. Commonwealth, 432 N.E.2d 708, 709 (Mass. 1982).
19 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(a).
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ground that the confinement or restraint was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.20
In order to effectively present his or her case, the petitioner
would first need to exculpate himself with DNA testing. Despite
having a right to request relief, the law does not provide an
absolute right to obtain DNA testing.21 Instead, the petitioner
must follow the procedures provided in Rule 30, section (c)(4).
Pursuant to section (c)(4), petitioners will be granted access to
the state's evidence "[w]here affidavits filed by the moving
In such
party ... establish a prima facie case for relief...."22
cases the "the judge on motion of any party . .. may authorize
such discovery as is deemed appropriate."2 3
While this rule may seem vague, the reporter's notes provide
guidance to courts applying the rule.24 A petitioner is entitled to
discovery if the allegations presented in their affidavit "show
reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to
relief."25 This standard is identical to the "good cause" threshold
used to determine if a state prisoner is entitled to discovery
during habeas corpus proceedings.2 6 In a habeas proceeding, the
rule has been interpreted to permit discovery when it will assist
the petitioner in asserting his underlying claim.27 As the district
court noted in United States ex rel. Pecorarov. Page," this is not

20

Id.

See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1267 (Mass. 2003)
("Discovery in the context of a new trial motion ... is not a matter of right.").
22 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4).
21

23

Id.

Before moving forward, it is important to take note of the level of authority
afforded to the reporter's notes. Though they are not technically part of the law, they
are of enough importance that they are included with the text of the statute when it
is posted for public comment. See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL BRANCH,
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO RULE 28 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CRIMINAL
available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/prop-rev-r28-crimPROCEDURE,
proc.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). Courts have looked to the reporter's notes for
guidance when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Caccia v. Caccia, 663 N.E.2d 1246,
1248 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) ("As the Reporter's Notes indicate ... this amendment
renders inapplicable the contrary holding in Hawkins v. Hawkins. . .
25 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes).
26 28 USC § 2254, R 6.00.0(c) (2006).
21 See Gaitan-Campanioni v. Thornburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1355, 1356 (E.D. Tex.
1991).
28 No. 97 C 5361, 1998 WL 708856, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1998 Sept. 30, 1998).
24
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a "demanding" standard. Thus, Rule 30, section (c)(4) should be
read as setting a relatively low threshold for obtaining postconviction discovery.
However, courts have not always followed the interpretation
advanced in the reporter's notes when ruling on petitions.
Though there is a limited amount of available case law
discussing post-conviction petitions for DNA testing, the little
that is available displays conflicting modes of analysis. Robert
Wade was convicted of raping and murdering an eighty-threeyear old woman.29 Investigators found semen at the scene of the
crime, and the prosecutor argued at trial that it had come from
Wade.3" After failing to prove his innocence at trial, Wade filed a
petition requesting production of the semen samples recovered at
the scene of the crime.31 Since Wade had been convicted of a
single-perpetrator rape-murder, he argued that DNA testing
would conclusively prove he was not the culprit.32 A justice of the
Superior Court denied his motion.3 The justice held that the
strength of evidence offered at trial made it unlikely that the test
results would be exculpatory.34 The court further held that even
if it were to ignore the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the
court would not be obligated to "find this self-serving conclusion
credible."
On appeal, Wade's motion was again denied.36 The justice
held that "[b]ased on all of [the] inculpatory information, coupled
with other evidence produced at trial" there was no reason to
grant Wade's motion. Massachusetts's highest court affirmed
the denial without an opinion." The justices ruling on Wade's
petition held him to a higher standard than the low threshold
29

See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17,

2003).
" Post-OsborneMotion for Summary Judgment at 10, Commonwealth v. Brady,
No. 04-12135NG (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2010).
31 See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856, at 1-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
17, 2003).
32 See id.
3 See id.
34 See id.
36 Post-OsborneMotion for Summary Judgment at 10, Commonwealth v. Brady,
No. 04-12135NG (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim.
No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003).
36 See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17,
2003).
3 Id.
38 See Wade v. Brady (Sup. Jud. Ct. 2004).
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test provided in the reporter's notes. A petitioner held to this
higher standard would need to make two showings in order to be
granted discovery: (1) that the evidence offered at trial was weak
enough to allow for the possibility of exculpatory results; and
(2) that the DNA test results are likely to be exculpatory.
The Massachusetts courts' application of the law, however,
has been inconsistent, and the court has not always required
petitioners to make a showing that testing is likely to produce
In Commonwealth v. Evans,3 9 the
exculpatory results.
petitioners were convicted of murder. They contended that a
man named Tinsley had actually committed the murder, and
that the victim's blood was on his coat. 4 0 They sought DNA
testing of a bloodstain to conclusively prove this connection.4 1
Here, Massachusetts's highest court, in an opinion handed down
just a year before its decision in Wade's case, held that the
petitioners were not entitled to discovery.42 Unlike in Wade, the
court assumed that test results would be exculpatory, but found
that exculpatory test results would not have undermined the
prosecution's theory.4 3
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Conkey," the petitioner had
been convicted of murder. 45 He contended that several hairs
found on the victim's body, which had been forcibly removed,
must have been pulled from the perpetrator's head during a
struggle. 46 Additionally, he contended that the true perpetrator
was the victim's landlord, and that a speck of the victim's blood
on a note the landlord had turned over to the police would
connect him to the crime.47 The court disagreed with his
assessment and denied his request, holding that the petitioner
had failed to prove DNA testing "would have yielded results"
likely to influence the jury's verdict. 48 Like the Evans court, the

3 786 N.E.2d 375 (Mass. 2003).
40 See id. at 390-91.
41 See id. at 390.
42 See id. at 393.
41 See id.
I No. 95-99, 2003 WL 22120176 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003).

16 See id. at *1.
46

7
48

See id. at *14.

See id. at *14-15.
Id. at *14.
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court here assumed the test results would be exculpatory but
held that exculpatory results would have little to no effect on the
prosecution's case.4 9
Thus, there is a conflict between the text of Rule 30 and its
application by the Massachusetts state courts. The reporter's
notes indicate that the statute has a low threshold for awarding
discovery. Discovery, according to the notes, is appropriate when
it is likely to lead to the production of evidence that would have
influenced the jury's decision."o In practice, however, the state's
highest court has endorsed conflicting applications of the rule. In
Wade, despite DNA's ability to conclusively eliminate the
possibility that the petitioner was guilty, the court declined to
assume test results would be exculpatory and instead held that
the weight of inculpatory evidence prohibited the granting of
Conversely, in Evans, the court assumed DNA
discovery."
testing would be exculpatory but based its denial on the fact that
even exculpatory results would not have affected the outcome at
These conflicting methods of analysis cannot be
trial.52
reconciled with one another, and provide the basis for
challenging the constitutional validity of Massachusetts's
procedures.
II.

POST-OSBORNE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
3
within its jurisdictionthe equal protection of the laws.5

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides two types of protection: procedural" and substantive. 5
In simplest terms, procedural due process guarantees that the
government will use just and fair procedures before taking away
49 Id.
at *14-15. The validity of the Conkey court's interpretation is
questionable. On a subsequent appeal, the decision was reversed and remanded on
unrelated grounds, but the court declined to consider the post-conviction discovery
petition. See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 74-75 (2004).
50 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30 (reporter's notes).
51 See Commonwealth v. Wade, No. 94856, at 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2003).
52 See Commonwealth v. Evans, 786 N.E.2d 375, 393 (Mass. 2003).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
54 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
-, See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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a person's life, liberty, or property." Substantive due process is a
much broader theory and applies when the government is
infringing upon a fundamental right, such as the right to
privacy." Under substantive due process, the deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by the government is not valid merely
because the procedures employed were constitutionally sound."
Instead, there must also be a valid governmental reason for the
deprivation.59
In Osborne,' the petitioner had been convicted of the
assault, kidnapping, and sexual assault of a prostitute in
Anchorage, Alaska.6 ' His conviction, in part, relied upon DQ
Alpha testing of a sperm sample found at the scene of the crime.62
Unlike modern forms of DNA testing, DQ Alpha testing can only
narrow the field of suspects to approximately five percent of the
Osborne found himself within that five percent of
population.
the population, but now, fifteen years after his conviction, sought
modern testing to exonerate himself."' Osborne argued that the
procedures for obtaining access to the state's evidence violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, and
further argued that substantive due process entitled him to
obtain exculpatory evidence.
The Court held that there was no substantive right to obtain
DNA testing in the context of a post-conviction proceeding." The
Court reasoned that the recent proliferation of state postconviction statutes was evidence that state legislatures were
handling the issue, and any action by the Federal Judiciary
would turn the courts into a legislature, responsible for
establishing standards and procedures.6 7 Moreover, deciding this

See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
* See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
* See id.
6 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009).
66
5

61 See id. at 2314.

See id. at 2313.
See id.
I See id. at 2315.
65 See id. at 2316.
6 See id. at 2322.
67 See id.
62

6
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issue opened the door to federal courts deciding related issues
such as the length of time and the proper conditions for storage
of biological evidence.
Osborne's claim of a right to post-conviction DNA testing,
however, would still be afforded protection by procedural due
process," albeit on a more limited level than substantive due
process would have afforded. The Supreme Court held that a
petitioner's right to DNA testing survives conviction if there is a
state created liberty interest in obtaining test results.7 0 Alaska
had created such a right through its general post-conviction
statute, which allowed for relief when "there exists evidence of
material facts, not previously presented and heard by the court,
that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
The state's decision to bestow upon
interest of justice."'
prisoners a right to prove their innocence "beg[a]t yet other
rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent
right."7 2 Essentially, because Alaska decided to give prisoners a
chance at proving their innocence, the state now had to make
sure that it was a fair chance.
Though Osborne had argued that the Court should apply the
more exacting Mathews test" in deciding if Alaska's statute
violated due process, the Court reasoned that Osborne had been
found guilty, and thus was not entitled to the same "liberty
interests as a free man."74 Instead, Osborne's procedural due
process claim would be decided by applying the more forgiving
test outlined in Medina v. California.5 Under Medina, the
state's procedures would only be found inadequate if they
"offend[ I some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" or
" See id. at 2323.
69See id. at 2319.
70 See id. at 2319 ("Osborne does ... have a liberty interest in demonstrating his
innocence with new evidence under state law.") (emphasis added).
n1ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (2010).
72 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319 (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 463 (1981)).
7 The Mathews test involves the weighing of three factors: (1) the accuracy
gained by using the petitioner's proposed procedures; (2) the cost incurred by the
government by applying the petitioner's standards; and (3) the importance of the
right that the government is taking from the petitioner. See generally Mathews, 424
U.S. 319.
" Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
' 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
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"transgress[I any recognized principle of 'fundamental
fairness.' "" The majority held that the procedures, on their face,
were valid, since they created a right of access to the evidence
subject only to reasonable conditions." Osborne, however, had
only utilized these procedures when requesting a more
antiquated version of DNA testing." Since Osborne had failed to
exhaust these remedies in pursuit of the modern testing he now
sought, he was incapable of proving that Alaska's procedures
were unconstitutional as applied."
Thus, in the wake of Osborne, the protection afforded to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
has been severely limited. For a petitioner to even bring a
federal claim, the state must first have invested the petitioner
with a liberty interest in obtaining testing. This is most often
done through post-conviction discovery statutes, though the
Osborne decision did also indicate that it is possible for the right
to be derived from other areas, such as a state constitution.
The state, however, is given wide latitude in determining what
procedures are permissible, and the Federal Judiciary will only
intercede if the procedures offend a fundamental principle of
justice"1 and are "inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights
provided.""
III. THE STATE COURT'S APPLICATION OF RULE 30 RUNS AFOUL
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

This Part argues that the Massachusetts post-conviction
discovery law, as applied, violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section A will apply the framework for
a post-Osborne procedural due process claim to Massachusetts's
application of Rule 30 and demonstrate that the court's
application offends the Due Process Clause. Section B will
advocate for the application of procedures that correct the
deficiencies of the current application.
Id. at 446 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (noting that none of the limitations Alaska
imposes offends the "traditions and conscience of our people" or "any recognized
principle of fundamental fairness").
76
77

7

See id.

79

See id.

80

See id. at 2321.

8
82

See Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
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A. Application of Rule 30 Offends ProceduralDue Process
For there to be a procedural due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must first create a liberty
interest. Here, that liberty interest is established by state law,
Rule 30. Subsection (a) of Rule 30 affords petitioners a "liberty
interest in demonstrating [their] innocence with new evidence.""
Indeed, the liberty interest created by Rule 30 is nearly identical
to the liberty interest that was at stake in Osborne."
Massachusetts, through section (c) of Rule 30, has created
procedures for obtaining post-conviction DNA testing.
Petitioners are to file affidavits with the court establishing a
prima facie case for relief, and when the circumstances justify it,
the judge may grant whatever discovery he deems appropriate."
The reporter's notes to Rule 30 provide guidance to judges
charged with determining if post-conviction discovery is
appropriate, and indicate that discovery should be granted when
it may lead to the development of facts that could indicate the
petitioner is innocent. Thus, the Massachusetts legislature has
created a liberty interest for prisoners in obtaining DNA testing
and has provided procedures for vindicating that right.
On its face, Rule 30 does not violate procedural due process,
and indeed the First Circuit recently held as much in Tevlin v.
Spencer." The court, in applying the standard established by
Osborne, stated that Rule 30 does not "transgress[I any
recognized principle of fundamental fairness" for petitioners
seeking DNA testing.89 The court of appeals' decision is likely
correct, especially in light of the reporter's notes' requirement
that testing would "produce results that likely would influence
the jury's conclusion." 0 However, in Osborne, the Supreme Court
stated that the Court's analysis is not confined to the text of the
statute, but it would also consider the law's fundamental fairness
in application as well."
' See id. at 2319.
84

Id.

" See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(a); Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319.
6 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4).
See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes).
8 621 F.3d 59, 71 (1st Cir. 2010).
8 Id.
90MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes).
91 See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321
(2009) ("But it is [the petitioner's] burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
8
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It is the application of Rule 30 that offends procedural due
process. The Massachusetts courts' application of Rule 30 is
deficient in two regards: (1) it only requires consideration of the
weight of the prosecution's evidence; and (2) it does not consider
the potential unreliability of the prosecution's evidence. These
deficiencies render their application fundamentally unfair, and in
violation of the Medina standard applied by the Court in
Osborne.92

1.

Massachusetts Courts Are Only Required To Give Weight to
the Prosecution's Evidence
In order for the Massachusetts state courts to give equal
weight to both the petitioners and the prosecutor's argument,
they must assume exculpatory test results. Though there is a
limited amount of case law in which the courts decided Rule 30,
section (c)(4) motions in the context of a petition for DNA testing,
the available case law illustrates one point: Courts are not
required to make such an assumption.9 3 Indeed, Massachusetts's
highest court has affirmed decisions that involved an assumption
of exculpatory results, 94 and has also affirmed decisions that
The
explicitly ignore the effect of exculpatory results.95
acceptance of these conflicting methods of analysis permits the
courts to rule on a petition without giving any consideration to
the effects of possibly exculpatory test results.
In effect, courts are free to consider only the prosecution's
evidence. Such an analysis is not only unfair, it is illogical. The
Supreme Court of the United States agreed that this method of
analysis was flawed when, in an unrelated case, it held that "by
evaluating the strength of only one party's evidence, no logical
conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary
evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt."" A
refusal to assume exculpatory results effectively affords the
petitioner's evidence no weight in the analysis. Unlike other
state-law procedures available to him in state postconviction relief These
procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying them, Osborne can hardly
complain that they do not work in practice.") (citation omitted).
92 See id. at 2320 (discussing the proper framework for analyzing the state's
procedures).
9 See discussion supra Part I.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
' See supra text accompanying notes 29-38.
1 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).
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forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, the value of
DNA cannot be known until it is tested, and prior to its testing
the biological evidence holds no persuasive power. Courts, such
as those that decided the petition in Wade," are not considering
the ability of DNA testing to help the petitioner develop the facts
of his claim.9" Instead they are forecasting the outcome of test
results based on the strength of the inculpatory evidence offered
at trial. Given that the prosecution has already introduced
enough evidence to convict the petitioner beyond a reasonable
doubt, such an approach defeats the claim before it is given fair
consideration, and leaves the petitioner without a fundamentally
adequate means of vindicating the rights provided in Rule 30.
In addition to creating an impossibly high hurdle for the
petitioner, a failure to assume exculpatory results also ignores
the proper role of the judiciary in assessing post-conviction
discovery requests. It is plain from the text of Rule 30 and the
reporter's notes that it is not the job of the judiciary to predict
the results of DNA testing. Instead, the proper role of the
judiciary is to determine whether favorable results would
The
undermine confidence in the petitioner's conviction."
testing.
of
DNA
context
the
in
particularly
legislature agreed,
Rule 30 was amended in 2001 to require that notice of the
request for discovery is given to the opposing party.100 This, the
reporter's notes say, was of particular relevance in the case of
DNA testing because the court would be considering "the
potential relevance of the results to the ground the motion
advances for a new trial."o Use of the word "potential" is key to
understanding the judiciary's role in assessing a petition for
discovery. The word "potential" suggests that the court should
" See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856, at 3-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
17, 2003).
* See supra text accompanying notes 29-38 (discussing the denial of Wade's
motion on grounds that the weight of inculpatory evidence offered at trial made it
unlikely that DNA testing would provide exculpatory results).
" A strict reading of the Rule and reporter's notes indicates that the judiciary's
role is to determine if discovery will assist the petitioner in developing the facts of
his claim, not engage in judicial guesswork about the likelihood of achieving that
end. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes) ("Discovery is appropriate
where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner
may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he or she is entitled
to relief."); see also infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
100

See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes).

oxMASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes) (emphasis added).

GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT

2011]

1609

not be concerned with what will be the actual outcome of the test,
but rather should be concerned with the impact they could
potentially have on the petitioner's claim.
Support for this reading of Rule 30 can be found in the
courtrooms of other states that were applying their own postconviction discovery rules. In a recent decision, Texas's highest
court held that "it is not our task to determine the likelihood that
DNA testing will obtain results that are exculpatory."10 2 Instead,
the court's task is to "determine whether a defendant would have
been convicted in the event that the results are exculpatory."103
The probability of obtaining exculpatory results is alien to the
purpose of the court's inquiry.10 4 The 261 DNA exonerations that
have occurred in the last twenty years demonstrate that judicial
guesswork is likely to lead to "significant and needless risk of
erroneous deprivation."os
The Department of Justice offered further support for this
interpretation of the judiciary's role. In a 1999 report from the
National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"), Attorney General Janet
Reno encouraged greater cooperation among prosecutors,
defendants and the judiciary.10 6 After reviewing the NIJ's report,
she concluded that testing should be performed in cases "in
which DNA testing may be determinative of innocence."107

There is a consensus developing amongst the statesos that
procedures that do not assume exculpatory results are
fundamentally unfair. The overwhelming majority of states
agree that in order for post-conviction relief to "comport[ I with
fundamental fairness" the court's analysis must presume

In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
Id.
104 A federal judge recently stated
"[wihen a court ... assesses the possibility that the results of results of
DNA test will be exculpatory, it substitutes its speculation for the process
of actually conducting a test. Such an inquiry creates a substantial
possibility that a court will decide that the defendant was probably guilty
based on the evidence produced at trial, and thus conclude that the result
of any DNA testing would not be exculpatory."
McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
102
103

1o5

Id. at 483.

10 See NATL COMM'N ON THE FUTURE

OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 10 at iii.

'0 Id. (emphasis added).

"' See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) ("[T]he primary and most
reliable indication of consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws.").
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exculpatory results.'o
Forty-eight states and the federal
government have statutes in effect that specifically address postconviction DNA testing. 10 These statutes detail the threshold a
petitioner must meet before the court will grant their request for
testing.'1 '
Though the wording and requirements of each
statute's threshold varies," there is a common thread among all
of them: an inquiry into the probative value of DNA testing. In
fact, several statutes explicitly require, or have been interpreted
to require, a presumption of exculpatory test results.113
Massachusetts's state courts are permitted to deny petitions
for post-conviction discovery without considering the potential
effects of exculpatory test results. Such an approach is not only
counter to the text of Rule 30 and the reporter's notes, but
decisions reached by such a method are, by the Supreme Court of
the United States' estimation, "arbitrary."11 4 An application of
the Rule that considers only one side of the argument
transgresses a recognized principle of fundamental fairness by
denying petitioners a decision on the merits of their claim.1 '
10 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (The procedures in a
post-conviction relief statute are constitutional only if they "comport[] with
fundamental fairness").
no See Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http-//www.innocenceproject.org/Content/AccessTo_PostConvictionDNATesting.p
hp (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
"' See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(8)(B) (2005); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-8(4)
(2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(c) (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 440.30(1-a)(a)
(McKinney 2004); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 64.03(a) (West 2007).
112 For instance, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(B)(1) (2000) requires a showing that
"[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted
or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through deoxyribonucleic acid
testing," while 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii)(A) (2002) requires a showing of
"the applicant's actual innocence of the offense for which the applicant was
convicted," and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4504(a)(3) (2000) requires that "the movant
present[] a prima facie case that identity was an issue in the trial."
" Pursuant to Arizona's DNA testing statute, DNA testing shall be granted if
"[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted
or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through deoxyribonucleic acid
testing." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(B)(1) (2000). Additionally, Tennessee's highest
court has held that in applying its post-conviction DNA testing statute, the court
must assume exculpatory results. See Shuttle v. State, 2004 WL199826, at *4, *5
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
114 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. at 331 ("[B]y evaluating the strength of
only one party's evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the
strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt.
Because the rule applied by the [court] in this case did not heed this point, the rule
is 'arbitrary.' ").

n" See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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Recognition of this can be found in the courtrooms and
legislatures that have echoed this conclusion in their case law
and statutes. By allowing courts to rule on post-conviction
discovery motions without assuming exculpatory results,
Massachusetts has deprived petitioners of their liberty interest
without employing fundamentally fair procedures.
Massachusetts Courts Fail To Consider the Potential
Fallibility of Non-DNA Evidence
In addition to ignoring the potential probative value of DNA
testing, courts, such as the one in Wade, fail to consider the
potential weaknesses of the prosecution's evidence. In Wade,
both courts that issued opinions relied upon the strength of the
evidence that was offered at trial. The prosecution used the
defendant's own incriminating statements11 6 and a serology
report to convict the defendant."' It may seem reasonable to
conclude that it would be pointless to allow Wade to try and
disprove his own statements. Yet, such a position ignores the
possibility that other factors may have led to his admission.
Similarly, courts that base their decisions on other forms of
evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, ignore the possibility
that the evidence, and by extension the jury verdict, were simply
wrong.
The history of wrongful convictions in the United States has
demonstrated that the criminal justice system is prone to
inaccuracy. Since the first DNA exoneration in 1989,1" 273
wrongfully convicted individuals have been able to prove their
innocence through the use of DNA testing. 19 Studies of the trial
2.

no See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856, at 3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
17, 2003). At trial, Wade asserted that his sexual encounter with the eighty-threeyear-old woman was consensual. Post-OsborneMotion for Summary Judgment at 10,
Commonwealth v. Brady, No. 04-12135NG (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003).
n' See id. at 4.

us Facts on DNA Post Conviction Exonerations,supra note 6.
no See id. Nearly all of the 273 DNA exonerations have involved rape and
murder cases. DNA evidence has not, as of yet, been consistently used to assess guilt
for lesser crimes. Samuel Gross, a professor at University of Michigan, conducted a
study that concluded there are likely many more wrongfully convicted individuals in
jail for lesser offenses. Though capital cases account for only 0.25% of prison
inmates, they represented twenty-two percent of the exonerated population. Capital
cases, according to Professor Gross, draw more attention and thus greater scrutiny.

1612

ST JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 85:1595

records in wrongful convictions have revealed that most were
supported by what appeared to be solid evidence. Despite the
weight of that evidence, DNA was able to conclusively prove that
the verdict reached at trial was wrong. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Osborne, "DNA testing has an unparalleled
ability ... to exonerate the wrongly convicted."12 0 Despite this,
Massachusetts still permits its courts to rely on the strength of
less accurate, and often times incorrect evidence in determining
if a petitioner's claim warrants DNA testing.
It would be easy to write off wrongful convictions as the
product of inept defense attorneys, or corrupt prosecutors. The
performance of prosecutors and defense attorneys certainly
contributes to some wrongful convictions, but they are not the
leading cause. In fact, those causes do not even rank amongst
the top three.12 ' Instead, those positions are occupied by
eyewitness misidentification, improper forensic science, and selfincriminating statements.12 2 The presence of any of these factors
would seem damning for a defendant, but history has illustrated
that none offer the accuracy that a layman, or even a judge,
would assume they possess. 2 3
a.

Eyewitness Misidentification

The unreliability of eyewitness identification is hardly a
recent revelation. In 1908 Hugo Munsterberg published a study
questioning the reliability of witness testimony.124 Less than
His study concluded that "if we reviewed prison sentences with the same level of
care that we devote to death sentences, there would have been more than 28,500
non-death-row exonerations . . . ." Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A15. Regardless of the accuracy of
Professor Gross's extrapolation, it is undeniable that people have been wrongfully
convicted of lesser crimes, and thus the exact number of wrongful convictions is
unknowable but undoubtedly larger than 273.
120 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009).
121 Facts on DNA Post Conviction Exonerations,supra note
6.
122 See id.
122 Massachusetts has only been home to a small fraction of DNA exonerations.
See Browse the Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org/know/
Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) (documenting that only nine
exonerees were convicted in Massachusetts courts). As such, it provides too small a
sample for a full consideration of the ability of DNA to undermine the prosecution's
evidence. This Section will consider the evidence in all 261 DNA exonerations to
demonstrate the fallibility of the criminal justice system.
124 See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908). Prof. Munsterberg
recounted his own experience as a witness and described the manner in which,
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thirty years later, Edwin Borchard published a study of sixty-five
eyewitness
that
and concluded
convictions
wrongful
misidentification was the leading cause of wrongful
convictions. 125 The history of DNA exonerations supports both of
their contentions.
Eyewitness misidentification is the most prevalent cause of
wrongful convictions. Witness testimony played a role in the
convictions of seventy-nine percent of the first 200 DNA
exonorees.126 In twenty-five percent of those cases, there were at
least two eyewitnesses that testified.12 7 In an additional thirteen
percent of cases, three or more witnesses testified.1 28 The lack of
reliability becomes even more startling when considered in light
of the fact that eyewitness misidentification was the central
cause of a conviction in fifty percent of DNA exonerations.129
It is easy to understand why a jury would be swayed by
eyewitness testimony, after all "seeing is believing." Yet, there
have been more than sixty cases where multiple witnesses
implicated the same person but were still wrong."so In fact, it is
so common that the Supreme Court noted that the criminal law
is "rife with instances of mistaken identification."' 3 ' The court's
application of Rule 30 does not require a consideration of this
possibility, and a simple review of the prosecution's evidence
would not reveal any reason to believe that witness testimony
was erroneous. Short of a recantation, the only way the witness
could be proven wrong is by DNA testing. Yet, by not mandating
that courts consider the possibility that eyewitness testimony is
despite his best intentions, time had caused his memory of events to change. He
surmised that "in a thousand courts . .. witnesses every day affirm by oath in
exactly the same way. . . ." Id. at 43.
125 See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
Borchard's

study includes the story of a man wrongfully convicted of cashing bad checks. At his
trial seventeen witnesses took the stand and identified him as the culprit. When the
true culprit was apprehended the prosecutor wondered how so many people could be
wrong, especially since "there wasn't a similarity about [the wrongfully convicted
and the true culprit]." Id. at 1-6.
121 See Garrett,supra note 8, at 78. In 135 of the 158 cases of misidentification
considered by Garrett, the victim testified. See id. at 79.
127 Reevaluating Lineups: Why Witnesses Make Mistakes and How To Reduce
the Chance of a Misidentification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/docs/Eyewitness-IDReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
128
129

See id.
See id.

s See id.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).

131
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inaccurate, petitioners are not provided with a meaningful
procedure for vindicating their right. The argument of a
petitioner seeking post-conviction DNA testing is that the
evidence offered at trial is inaccurate, and DNA testing will
prove that contention. However, if the court is not required to
consider the possibility that the evidence at trial is fallible, than
the analysis is effectively short circuited.
b.

Faulty ForensicScience
Jurors, and perhaps judges, would likely be surprised to
learn that much of the forensic science that has been popularized
by the media and popular culture 3 2 is of limited probative value,
or unreliable because of the analysts' methods.' 3 The most
common forensic evidence introduced in wrongful convictions is
serology 34 reports. Though reliable, serology is of limited
probative value when used to determine a donor's identity
because it only sorts donors by blood type.3 s Quite obviously,
large portions of the population share the same blood type.3 6
DNA, by contrast, can "provide random match probabilities
greater than all humans who ever lived," such as a 1 in 100
trillion match.'37
More troubling is the proliferation of cases involving the
admission of forensic evidence that was unreliable. For instance,
twenty-two percent of wrongful convictions involved hair fiber

132 Television programs, such as the CBS's popular C.S.L series, have created an
expectation among jurors that absent testimony from the victim, forensic science is
necessary for a conviction. See generally Hon. Donald E. Shelton, The 'CSI Effect':
Does It Really Exist?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., March 2008, at 1.
113 Press Release, Nat'l Acad. of Sci., 'Badly Fragmented' Forensic Science
System Needs Overhaul; Evidence to Support Reliability of Many Techniques is
Lacking (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http/www8.nationalacademies.org/
onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RECORDID=12589 ("Much research is needed not only to
evaluate the reliability and accuracy of current forensic methods but also to innovate
and develop them further.").
* Serology is the study of the bodily fluids such as blood, semen, and saliva. See

LARRY S. MILLER, WILLIAM M. BASS & RAMONA MILLER, HUMAN EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49 (2d ed. 1985).

See Garrett, supra note 8, at 81-82.
13sFor instance, the smallest group is AB Rh negative, which comprises 0.6% of
the population. The largest group, 0 Rh positive, comprises 37.4% of the population.
See Blood Types in the United States, STANFORD SCH. OF MED. BLOOD CTR,
http://bloodcenter.stanford.edulaboutblood/blood-types.html (last visited Sept. 17,
135

2011).
137

Garrett, supra note 8, at 82.
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it is
Though it is notoriously unreliable,'
analysis.a 8
nonetheless used to convict defendants.14 0 This is not a problem
relegated to fringe sciences like hair analysis, but instead
extends to more accepted forms such as fingerprint analysis. In
2005, Congress launched an investigation into the use of forensic
sciences in the courtroom.141 The five-year study concluded that
the lack of standards in testing procedures and lab oversight
severely weakened the reliability of test results. 4 2
Perhaps most troubling is that forensic analysts often
provide invalid testimony. A recent study of the trial transcripts
of 156 exonorees found that in sixty percent of cases the
testifying analyst either misstated empirical data or testified to
facts that could not be supported by their own data.143 The
erroneous testimony did not come from a small group of repeat
offenders, but instead came from seventy-two different analysts
from fifty-two laboratories, practices, or hospitals in twenty-five
states. 144
Self-IncriminatingStatements
For many juries and judges, a confession or incriminating
statement can serve as the peg on which to hang a conviction. As
noted, in the Wade case the courts refused the petitioners request
c.

'"

See id. at 81.

" The National Academy of the Sciences report on forensic science explicitly
stated that hair analysis was not a reliable means of identification. NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 161 (2009)
("[Testimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular defendants is highly
unreliable."). Paul C. Giannelli noted in Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A
Cautionary Tale that the DOJ was keenly aware of the role hair analysis played in
wrongful convictions as early as 1996. See Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair
Comparisons,46 CRIM L. BULL. (2010).
140 Calvin Scott spent twenty years in prison after being wrongfully convicted of
rape. The primary evidence offered at his trial was hair fiber analysis, which
concluded that his hair was "microscopically consistent" with a hair found at the
scene. See Know the Cases: Calvin Lee Scott, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/CalvinLeeScott.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
1' See Steven Mills, Some Techniques Long Suspect, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2009,
§ C, at 6.
142 See Natl Acad. of Sci., supra note 133.
' See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
'" See id.
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for DNA testing in part because at trial he had made
incriminating statements.4 s What value does DNA evidence
have when the petitioner has already admitted to the act?
Despite the lack of credibility vested in a petition by a
confessed convict, DNA evidence has proven time and time again
that even this category of petitions is potentially meritorious.146
The prosecution introduced a false confession at sixteen percent
of the convictions that were later overturned by DNA evidence. 4 1
Seven of those convictions resulted in a death sentence for the
defendant.1 48 A fear of losing their lives to a prison sentence or
the death penalty deterred these people from asserting their
innocence at trial, and under the Massachusetts's courts'
application of its post-conviction discovery statute, it could
prevent them from accessing the only evidence powerful enough
to prove their innocence.
The common thread amongst the leading causes of wrongful
convictions is that at first blush they seem like strong, even foolproof evidence.'
Who would know what happened better than
someone who witnessed the crime? How can you challenge the
accuracy of science? Why would someone ever confess to a crime
they did not commit? Perhaps a similar line of reasoning fueled
the decision in the Wade cases,5 0 but regardless of the rationale,
history has proven that you cannot discount the possibility that
At trial, as part of Wade's defense he admitted to sleeping with the victim,
but contended it was consensual. Post-Osborne Motion for Summary Judgment at
10, Commonwealth v. Brady, No. 04-12135NG (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003). When he
later requested DNA testing, he claimed he had never had sex with the victim. See
Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856, at 1-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2003).
146 Marcellius Bradford falsely confessed to his involvement in the rape and
murder of a young medical student in order to avoid a life sentence. DNA testing
later exonerated him and his co-defendants. See Jeff Coen, Guilty Pleas Close a
'Horrible Saga'; 2 Admit Roles in 1986 Murder of Lori Roscetti, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17,
2004, at C1.
147 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 88.
14 See id. at 88-89.
149 Given the history of eyewitness misidentification, faulty forensic science and
even false confessions, it is unimaginable that the Massachusetts courts would
continue to engage in speculation as to the likelihood of DNA testing providing
exculpatory results. An early study of DNA exonerations found that in fifty percent
of the cases the reviewing court denied the wrongfully convicted's request for relief
because of their likely guilt. In ten percent of the cases the court recognized the
"overwhelming" evidence of guilt. Id. at 107-09. The study producing these results
only considered the first 133 DNA exonerations that involved written decisions.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 29-38.
141
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evidence is wrong. No other form of evidence offers the accuracy
that DNA provides."s' Had the judges that considered the
discovery motions in the 261 DNA exonerations been permitted
to engage in a Wade analysis, it is unlikely that as many
petitioners would have succeeded. After all, all of the petitioners
had been judged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,152 so it would
be nearly impossible, absent DNA testing, for the petitioner to
prove that he is likely innocent. Placing the petitioner in such a
position does not provide him with an adequate means of
vindicating his rightl5 3 and is fundamentally unfair.
Massachusetts has an interest in excluding frivolous
innocence claims, and has been entrusted with the ability to
create the procedures to achieve that interest.15 4 The Supreme
Court has held that states have "a substantial interest in the
implementation of rules that regulate [DNA] testing" in such a
way as to exclude meritless innocence claims. 15 The procedure
applied in Wade may achieve this end, but does so in a manner
that is overly exclusive. In addition to screening meritless claims
it also has the potential to eliminate legitimate innocence
claims.1 6 Excluded meritorious petitioners are left without a
method of "harness[ing] the unique power of DNA testing," 15'
and thus are unable to vindicate the right provided for in Rule
30, section (a).158

151 See Dist. Att'y's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009)
("DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted
and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the
criminal justice system and police investigative practices."); see also id. at 2316
("Modem DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known
before.").
15 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) ("Guilt in a criminal
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the
Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard.").
153

Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2311.

14 See id. at 2317 ("These laws recognize the value of DNA evidence but also the
need for certain conditions on access to the State's evidence.").
155Id.

at 2329.

See supra Part III.A.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2329.
158 The Supreme Court has held that the "cost of protecting a constitutional
right, cannot justify its total denial." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
Therefore, the state cannot create a right and than choose to arbitrarily exclude
claims for the sake of limiting their costs.
156
157

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

1618

[Vol. 85:1595

B.

The Massachusetts Threshold Should Presume Exculpatory
Results and Consider Only Their Ability To Exonerate the
Petitioner
The proper role of a court in the context of a post-conviction
DNA testing application is to determine its ability to undermine
In order to accomplish this
the prosecution's theory of guilt.'
end, the court must presume exculpatory test results.o60 The
prosecution's evidence is only relevant insofar as it is able to
withstand exculpatory test results. For instance, in the Wade
case the petitioner was convicted of the single perpetrator rape
and murder of a non-sexually active, eighty-three year old
woman. 6 1 A semen sample was recovered from the scene of the
crime.16 If the semen did not come from the petitioner, then the
prosecution's theory would crumble. If, in the alternative, the
prosecution had proffered that the petitioner had acted with an
accomplice who was present at the time of the crime, then DNA
testing would not upset the prosecution's theory of conviction
because it is possible that while the DNA is not from the
petitioner, he may nevertheless have participated in the crime.
These proposed procedures are certainly more favorable to
petitioners than the current standard applied by the courts, but
it still bars the frivolous innocence claims the current threshold
excludes.16 3 Unlike the current threshold, it only bars frivolous
claims. The proposed threshold is properly focused on the ability
of DNA evidence to "demonstrate that [the petitioner] is entitled
to relief."164 Frivolous claims where DNA would have no value
relevant to the petitioners innocence claim are eliminated, while
a meritorious claim will always be awarded testing. This
1" See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd, 626
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010) ("If a prisoner would be entitled to the test results in the
event that those results are exculpatory, simply opining what the results are likely
to be poses a significant and needless risk of erroneous deprivation. This risk of
erroneous deprivation can be wholly eliminated if the court, in such cases, simply
authorizes the testing."); see also In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App.
2010) ("[Olur task... is to determine whether a defendant would have been
convicted in the event that the results are exculpatory.").
160See supra Part III.A.
161 See Commonwealth v. Wade, Crim. No. 94856 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 17,
2003).
162

See id.

See Dist. Att'y's Office v. Osborne, 552 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2329 (2009)
("[My point is that requests for postconviction DNA testing are not cost free.").
164 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (reporter's notes).
163
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properly focused procedure satisfies both the state's interest in
limiting the amount of applicants that will receive testing while
also allowing petitioners a fundamentally fair procedure for
vindicating their right. 6 5
The more inclusive nature of this threshold will undoubtedly
result in an increase in the number of DNA tests that the state
will have to perform, and thus lead to additional financial costs.
This is of particular concern, since currently nearly all state
crime labs have more testing requests than their staff can

handle. 6 6

Massachusetts has not escaped this trend.167

An

increase in the amount of testing will result in increased cost to
the state, but the importance of protecting a constitutional right
far outweighs the pecuniary cost.'66
Thus, to remedy the constitutional injuries caused by the
court's application of Rule 30, the procedures must be interpreted
as to require: (1) an assumption that testing of the biological
evidence will provide exculpatory results; and (2) a consideration
of whether exculpatory results will undermine the prosecution's
theory of conviction. Procedures meeting these requirements
provide petitioners with a fundamentally fair opportunity to
vindicate the rights Massachusetts granted in Rule 30.
CONCLUSION
There is no way to know how many innocent men and
women are currently imprisoned, but we can be certain that they
exist. Those who have been able to utilize the courts to vindicate
their right to post-conviction DNA testing spent, on average, over
a decade in prison. The loss of time says nothing of the
conditions they were unjustly subjected to while in prison.'6 9

See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320.
See Nicholas D. Kristof, Is Rape Serious?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A27.
See Brian R. Ballou, State Lab Still Behind on DNA Testing; But Is No
Longer Focused on Reducing Backlog, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2009, at 1.
1' See Kristof, supra note 166.
169 During
his testimony before the Maryland Commission on Capital
Punishment, Kirk Bloodsworth, the first death row inmate to be exonerated by DNA,
stated that prison was "hell on earth" and described having to stick wads of toilet
paper in his ears at night to prevent the "sea of cockroaches" from laying eggs in his
ears. HearingBefore the Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment (Md. 2008)
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capitalBloodsworth),
of Kirk
(statement
punishment/public-hearing-sep-5.php. Moreover, Bloodsworth was forced to endure
threats of rape from other inmates, see TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE
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Strangely enough, these men and women are the fortunate ones.
They were able to vindicate their rights and prove their
innocence through post-conviction DNA testing. Petitioners in
Massachusetts may not be as fortunate.
The Massachusetts threshold, as applied by the state courts,
permits judges to deny petitions for DNA testing based on the
strength of the evidence offered at trial. That the Massachusetts
legislature chose to create an avenue for post-conviction relief
signals recognition by the state that the criminal justice system
is fallible. Yet, by not mandating a presumption of exculpatory
results in applying Rule 30 the court undercuts the purpose of
the statute. Procedural due process mandates that petitioners be
given a fundamentally fair opportunity to vindicate their right to
relief. As presently constituted, the Massachusetts courts'
procedures do not guarantee petitioners a fundamentally fair
opportunity to prove their innocence. Unless Massachusetts or
the Federal Judiciary addresses these issues, innocent
petitioners in the state will be left without an avenue to escape
their wrongful convictions. 7 o

STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH Row INMATE EXONERATED BY DNA 105-06 (2004), and

developed an addiction to illegal narcotics, see id. at 231-33.
10 After Osborne, for a petitioner to challenge the fundamental adequacy of the
state's procedures he must first exhaust all the remedies provided to him by the
state. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321. Therefore, a petitioner in Massachusetts
would have to try his luck with the court's current application of Rule 30 before he
could bring a federal claim for deprivation of his right to procedural due process.
Given the extremely high stakes for petitioners, it would behoove Massachusetts to
be pro-active in this arena and not wait for the federal judiciary to force reform.

